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Abstract:  Evolutionarily conserved features have been demonstrated at many levels of biological 
organization across a variety of species. Evolutionary conservation may apply to complex 
behavioral phenomena too. It is thus not inconceivable that a form of sentience does exist even in 
the lowest order vertebrate taxon, the teleosts. How similar it is to human sentience in its level of 
complexity or in its multidimensional features is a difficult question, especially from an 
experimental standpoint, given that even the definition of human sentience is debated. Woodruff 
attempts a Turing-like test of fish sentience, and lists numerous neuroanatomic, 
neurophysiological and behavioral similarities between fish and humans. In this commentary, I add 
to these similarities by discussing empirical findings showing complex forms of mental 
representation in fish. At the same time, I note that without a more thorough understanding of 
human sentience and more data on similarities as well as differences between fish and mammals, 
the final conclusion may have to wait.  
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1. Evolutionary conservation at many levels of biology: Does it extend to sentience?  
 
Evolutionary biology has taught us that all species are related to each other. The question is only 
the degree of relatedness. We also know that evolution is a process whereby random genetic 
changes leading to alterations in previously existing phenotypes are tested in terms of how they 
increase or decrease the ability to reproduce under current environmental conditions. In other 
words, evolution is not a designer that creates things from scratch. Biologists find evolutionary 
homologies across a broad range of features and across a large number of species from fish to 
human. Steps of embryonic development, fundamental anatomical layout of brains, 
neurotransmitter systems and their receptors, molecular mechanisms of neuronal plasticity, and 
amino acid sequences of proteins all exhibit homologies, which are signs of common ancestry.  
Why should sentience be different? I would argue, therefore, that the question is not 
whether fish are sentient, but rather to what degree and in what flavor? In other words, where 
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do we draw the line? Or more provocatively, is there a line to draw at all? Clearly, human 
sentience is a species-typical feature of Homo sapiens. Fish do not have it. But does this prove 
that we are the only sentient creature walking (flying, swimming, crawling) on this planet? 
Woodruff’s (2017) target article makes a genuine effort to show us that it does not! 
 
2. Where do we draw the line? A Turing test for fish.  
 
According to Woodruff, fish do exhibit signs of sentience, a conclusion that depends upon how 
we define the phenomenon and associated underlying mechanisms. And there lies the biggest 
question: the definition of the phenomenon. We all think we know what it is to be aware, or to 
be sentient or conscious. But does science really know the answer to these questions? Woodruff 
attempts to answer by focusing on empirical, experimental definitions: mechanisms and 
behavioral responses, a Turing test (Turing, 1950) of sentience for fish. He shows us that fish do 
indeed possess features at the levels of anatomy, neurophysiology and behavior compatible with 
the assumption of the presence of sentience. The similarities he cites across human and fish 
features abound. But so do the differences (Bayés et al., 2017)! Which should we emphasize? And 
which represent proof or disproof?   
My own impression is that these questions are still to be discussed, and the answers will 
continue to be refined and re-discussed again and again. But let me add another angle to this 
discussion, leading back to the question of how we define sentience. To me, it appears this 
phenomenon has to do with modeling the external world. Mental representations of the outside 
allow the organism to remember the past, understand the present, and forecast the future, a 
phenomenon that in humans, and in some other mammals as well as some bird species, scientists 
call the ability to do “mental time travel” (Clayton, 2015). Mental representations imply that there 
is an actor, the self, that experiences, and plays a role in, the representation. Sentience may be 
an epiphenomenon, an emergent property of increasingly sophisticated mental representations 
afforded by complex brains. Setting aside questions about specific anatomy, connectome, 
electrophysiology and molecular mechanisms, do we know whether fish brains are complex 
enough for mental representations to form? From the results of behavioral studies, the answer 
to this question is: yes, we already do.  
 
3. Complex mental representations: What do fish learn and remember?  
 
I will give only two examples, from my own research. The ability to make numerical or quantity 
estimations is a human feature but it is also widespread in the animal kingdom (Feigenson et al., 
2004). A variety of fish species have been shown to be able to tell more from less, and, 
surprisingly, the way they do it also resembles how human children do it (Gómez-Laplaza & Gerlai, 
2016). Most recently, we have shown that a fish species, angelfish (Pterophyllum scalare), is not 
only capable of making the distinction between more and less when the item sets to be compared 
are present at the same time, but also when the items are not shown, i.e., when the fish have to 
remember where the items used to be (Gómez-Laplaza & Gerlai, 2016). In other words, we now 
have clear evidence of memory, i.e., mental representation of more vs. less in a fish species. Does 
this mean that fish “understand” the abstract meaning of more vs. less? are they “aware” of their 
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choices?  No, it does not. But it does show a level of sophistication in their mental representation 
abilities that in the past was thought to be uniquely human.  
The other example of complex mental representation in fish comes from our studies on 
spatial learning in zebrafish. As also discussed by Woodruff, the hallmark of episodic or declarative 
memory is its relational aspect (Eichenbaum, 1992). The ability to organize and relate what seem 
to be loosely related bits and pieces of information is a fundamental requirement for us to be able 
to remember where, what and when things happened to us, a function supported by the 
hippocampal formation. Thus, tests of relational memory have been used to analyze “declarative 
episodic” memory in non-human animals too (Eichenbaum, 1992), species that cannot talk. A 
frequently employed relational type of hippocampal memory task is the spatial memory test in 
which mammals (mostly rodents) learn the dynamic representation of visual cues outside the 
maze.  
But how do we know what they actually learn? This is a complicated question that has 
been explored experimentally. A rodent with a disrupted hippocampus can pick out a single cue 
from the background, turning the spatial task into an elemental task that it can seemingly perform 
well (Gerlai, 1998; Phillips & LeDoux, 1994). However, if a salient associative cue is experimentally 
provided in addition to the spatial cues, hippocampally lesioned animals cannot pick out a 
secondary cue, and thus will “recognize” the location of the reinforcer only when the associative 
cue is presented. Hippocampally intact mammals, on the other hand, can learn both at the same 
time: the dynamic spatial map, and the salient cue.  
Thus, when faced with the spatial task, hippocampally intact rodents can identify the 
location of the reinforcer even in the absence of the salient associative cue (Gerlai, 1998; Phillips 
& LeDoux, 1994). Surprisingly, so can zebrafish (Karnik & Gerlai, 2014). In other words, zebrafish 
acquire spatial information the same way rodents with an intact hippocampus do, despite the fact 
that zebrafish lack the hippocampal structure specific to mammalian brains. The ability to acquire 
a complex spatial map suggests sophisticated mental representation in fish. Does it mean fish are 
sentient? No, it does not. But this second Turing test of mental representation previously thought 
to be a sole property of complex mammalian brains has now also been passed with flying colors 
by fish. 
In sum, Woodruff’s arguments about the many similarities between fish and humans are eye-
opening. But to truly understand what it feels like to be a fish, we may need to appreciate both 
the similarities and the differences between us and them. We may even need a better 
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On November 17-18, 2017, the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and 
Consciousness, the NYU Center for Bioethics, and NYU Animal Studies will 
host a conference on Animal Consciousness. 
 
This conference will bring together philosophers and scientists to discuss 
questions such as: Are invertebrates conscious? Do fish feel pain? Are non-
human mammals self-conscious? How did consciousness evolve? How does 
research on animal consciousness affect the ethical treatment of animals? What 
is the impact of issues about animal consciousness on theories of consciousness 




Speakers and panelists include: 
  
Colin Allen (University of Pittsburgh, Department of History & Philosophy of 
Science), Andrew Barron (Macquarie, Cognitive Neuroethology),  
Victoria Braithwaite (Penn State, Biology), Peter Carruthers (Maryland, 
Philosophy), Marian Dawkins (Oxford, Zoology), Dan Dennett (Tufts, 
Philosophy), David Edelman (San Diego, Neuroscience),  
Todd Feinberg (Mt. Sinai, Neurology), Peter Godfey-Smith (Sydney, 
Philosophy), Lori Gruen (Wesleyan, Philosophy), Brian Hare (Duke, Evolutionary 
Anthropology), Stevan Harnad (Montreal, Cognitive Science), Eva Jablonka (Tel 
Aviv, Cohn Institute), Björn Merker (Neuroscience), Diana Reiss (Hunter, 
Psychology), Peter Singer (Princeton, Philosophy), Michael Tye (Texas, Philosophy) 
 
 
Organizers: Ned Block, David Chalmers, Dale Jamieson, S. Matthew Liao. 
 
The conference will run from 9am on Friday November 17 to 6pm on Saturday November 18 at the NYU Cantor Film Center (36 E 
8th St).  
 
Friday sessions will include “Invertebrates and the evolution of consciousness”, “Do fish feel pain?”, and “Animal consciousness 
and ethics”.  
 
Saturday sessions will include “Animal self-consciousness”, “Animal consciousness and theories of consciousness”, and a panel 
discussion.  
 
A detailed schedule will be circulated closer to the conference date. 
 
Registration is free but required.  
 
Register here.  
 
See also the conference website. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
